This paper uses a fire protection measure based on a community's tire insurance rating to estimate the strength of congestion effects for fire protectron services. The empirical results show that the congestion properties of fire protection are much like those of a pure public good. In addition, the paper introduces a new notion of returns to scale for public goods and estimates the relevant parameters for the fire protection case.
Introduction
While individual consumption of a Samuelsonian pure public good is insensitive to the size of the consuming group, some recent empirical work in local public finance realistically incorporates congestion effects: individual public good consumption falls, holding public sector resources fixed, as the size of the consuming group increases. In two important recent papers, Bergstrom and Goodman (1973) (B-G) and Borcherding and Deacon (1972) (B-D) attempted, among other things, to estimate the strength of congestion for various public goods.' Both papers postulated that the consumption level of a public good equals Xn?, where X is a measure of public output, n is the size of the consuming group, and ~50. Both papers assumed in addition that as a result of a majority voting process, public good consumption in a community is set at the level desired by the voter with the median income. A public good demand function was then used to derive an estimating equation relating public expenditure to a community's median income level, population, and other variables. The congestion parameter 7' was estimated by a nonlinear function of the regression coefficients from this equation.
While this procedure has the advantage that it permits estimation of 7 without direct measurement of the level of consumption of the public good, *I wish to thank Mark Browning, Robert Deacon, Ted Bergstrom, and Richard Muth for helpful comments. Any errors are my own.
'Congestion effects also play a role in the specification of the empirical models of Brueckner (1979b) and Deacon (I 978) .
it may lead to serious error. First, if the median voter model is a faulty representation of the public choice process at the local level, conclusions about public good congestion based on the empirical results arc invalid. Second, even when the median voter model is appropriate, if the public good demand function does not have the constant-elasticity form imposed in both papers, then the estimating equations will be misspecified, complicating the interpretation of the empirical results. The present study eliminates these possible sources of error by using a proxy for public good consumption to directly estimate the technological relationship between consumption, public good output, and population.
The paper studies municipal fire services and uses a community's fire insurance rating as a proxy for public consumption. which is taken to be the level of fire protection enjoyed by community residents. The empirical results suggest that the congestion properties of fire protection are close to those of a pure public good. In addition. the paper introduces a new notion of returns to scale for public goods and provides evidence on returns to scale for fire protection.
Section 2 presents a general model of a congested public good. section 3 extends the model to the fire protection case, and section 4 presents and analyses the empirical results.
A general model
A general expression giving the consumption level of a congested public good is where z is consumption, X is public good 'capacity', a measure of physical output, PI is the consuming group size, and s is a vector of environmental variables which affect the consumption level afforded by a given capacity. In the case of public parks, for example, s could include a measure of climate conditions which help determine the benefits afforded by a given park capacity. In the case of fire protection, s will be an index of fire hazards. It should be noted that (1) is a less general formulation than others found in the literature. Sandmo (1973) constructs a model where benefits are generated by joint consumption of private and public goods, and congestion is a result of excessive use of the private 'inputs' (too many cars on a freeway. for example).* Oakland (1972) develops a less intuitively appealing model where an individual may consume any amount of the public good up to a capacity level, with congestion determined by the relative magnitudes of capacity and the sum of individual consumption levels. The formulation
'In Sandmo's framwork. the benefir~ from a given fire protection c;~pacity would bc differs from both these approaches by constraining public consumption to be uniform across individuals.
While such a restriction is helpful in specifying an empirically implementable model, it also can be justified as a fairly realistic approximation.3
In the present model, public good congestion implies $2 50, and since a larger capacity raises consumption, other things equal, 4i >O. A likely range for the strength of congestion effects emerges from considering the elasticity of consumption with respect to n for the polar cases of private and pure public goods. Ignoring s for the moment, a publicly provided private good which is divided equally among members of the consuming group satisfies z =X/n.
In this case the elasticity of consumption with respect to n or 'elasticity of congestion', which is given by (n/z)(?z/?n), equals -1. A 1 percent increase in the group size reduces consumption by 1 percent, holding capacity fixed. For a pure public good, z = X and the elasticity of congestion equals zero. It seems reasonable to suppose that all publicly provided goods have congestion properties which are intermediate between the extreme cases of private and pure public goods. Letting 1 denote the congestion elasticity
which depends in general on X, n, and s, this assumption means -1 5 7 2 0. A natural notion of returns to scale for local public goods also emerges from (1). Assuming that 4 is homogeneous of degree k in X and n, the public good will exhibit {increasing/constant/decreasing} 'returns to scale in consumption' as k 5 0, meaning that consumption {increases/stays constant/decreases) when X and y1 are increased by the same proportion. While the specification z=Xn' used by B-G and B-D implies nondecreasing returns to scale in consumption when -15~ 50, the more general framework used here does not rule out decreasing returns. It is interesting to note that the degree of returns to scale in consumption tells how public consumption varies with community population when per cupitu public good capacity is held constant. This follows because X/n= c means consumption may be written as 4( uy1, II, s) = n"4 (c, 1, s). Consumption will {increase/stay constant/decrease] with the size of the community, holding Xjrr fixed, as
It is important to realize that returns to scale in consumption and returns to scale in the production of public good capacity are unrelated concepts.
'Another approach which yields nonuniform public consumption levels is that of Meyer (1971) , in which an individual's consumption level is discretionary (up to a capacity limit) and determined in part by opportunity costs. People with large back yards or swimming pools will not spend Saturdays at a public park even though the option I\ available to them.
J.K. Brueckner, Congested public goods
The latter issue must be considered, however, in deriving an estimating equation from (1) insurance market the premium will just cover the insured party's expected fire losses /, which depend on the level of fire protection and hence on the IS0 rating, and the insurer's administrative cost h, which is independent of R. Equating I + 11 to I! it follows that expected fire losses as a function of R are given by l(R)=c-h+ gR. Now a natural indicator of a community's level of fire protection is the variable 1(10)-1(R), which equals the difference between expected fire losses in a community essentially without tire protection (with an IS0 rating of 10) and expected losses in the given community.
That is, since 1(10)-1(R) measures the reduction in expected fire losses afforded by a community's fire suppression capability, it constitutes a natural indicator of the level of fire protection enjoyed by community residents. Since the variable 10 -R is proportional to 41t should be noted that one common notion of returns to scale in the empirical literature bears no relation to either of the above returns to scale concepts. Hirsch (1959 Hirsch ( , 1968 A modern, well-staffed fire department may be relatively ineffective in a community with poor water pressure, while the fire-fighting ability of a poorly operated fire department may be enhanced by a water system which permits the use of large quantities of water at the scene of a fire. Accordingly, it is assumed that a community's fire suppression capacity X is given by
where F represents fire department pumping capacity, W represents the delivery capacity of the water supply system, and tl, z,LO. It will be assumed that z exhibits constant returns to scale; doubling F and W doubles fire suppression capacity. As will be seen below, this assumption simplifies the discussion of returns to scale in consumption.
While direct observation of F and W is usually impossible, water supply and fire department expenditures are readily available and can be used to deduce the levels of F and W. Assuming that fire department pumping capacity is produced using inputs of capital and labor and that fire departments minimize the cost of providing a given level of pumping capacity, then fire department expenditures, E,, are given by
where 7t is the cost function for pumping capacity and JJ is the local wage rate. Since the price of fire department capital inputs will be approximately uniform across communities, it need not appear explicitly in the cost function.6 It is interesting to note that while substitution possibilities between labor and capital in the production of pumping capacity appear to be limited, fire departments are able to economize on labor inputs by undermanning their companies, a practice which is noted by the IS0 in assigning deficiency points. Another point is that it may be unrealistic to model a government agency as a cost-minimizer. Unfortunately, even though the pressure to keep costs low may be relatively weak in local government, it is impossible to deduce capacity levels from available data without the assumption of cost-minimization. Assuming that water supply capacity is produce,d with capital and labor. While a regression based on (6) will yield an estimate of the elasticity of congestion, estimating the degree of returns to scale in consumption requires the further assumption of constant returns in the production of both fire department and water supply capacity. Under these assumptions, E,=o(y)F and E, = E( ~a) W, giving Since T exhibits constant returns to scale, increasing Et and E, by a given proportion results in an equal proportional increase in X. Consequently. the degree of homogeneity of 1' in E,, E,, and II gives the degree of homogeneity of Q, in X and II, which is the degree of returns to scale in consumption. Although constant returns in the production of capacity is a strong assumption, the degree of returns to scale in consumption cannot be deduced from regression results without it. B-G and B-D also found it necessary to assume that public good capacity is produced with constant returns.
In Rider (1979) ], the requisite high density of fire stations means that equipment and personnel are idle much of the time. As a result, the reduction in the level of fire protection which accompanies an increase in population, holding suppression capacity fixed. will be due principally to longer response times. It seems doubtful that the resulting congestion effect will be as strong as in the private good case. While the purpose of this paper is not to construct a definitive model of fire suppression, the following stylized characterization, which ignores the role of the water supply system, provides some support for the preceeding conjecture. Suppose that the level of fire protection in a community is inversely proportional to average response time and that simultaneous fire alarms never occur, so that the protection level is inversely proportional to the average distance from a fire station." Approximating the service areas of fire stations by circles with radius t containing a population P, average distance is
where D is the (constant) population density of the service area. Since nt2 =P/D, average distance may be written $~'(P/TED). Letting X represent the number of fire stations, so that P=n/X, and recalling that the level of protection is inversely proportional to average distance, it follows after substituting for P that protection is proportional to J(DX/n). Now, letting jb denote the (positive) elasticity of population density with respect to n (a positive relationship is predicted by urban spatial models), the elasticity of congestion y can be written $1. -l), which lies between -f and zero under the reasonable assumption O<i< 1. Furthermore, it is easily seen that iL>O implies increasing returns to scale in consumption. ' The multiplicative form of (8) is consistent with the computation of the IS0 rating since extra deficiency points are levied depending on the extent of divergence between the qualities of the fire department and water supply. Since a poor water supply, for example, is thought to limit the contribution of the tire department, a multiplicative expression such as (8) Since the vast majority of communities operate their own water supply systems, deletions for this reason were not extensive.
The first row of table 1 gives the parameter estimates based on the entire sample. The estimated coefficients indicate as expected that, ceteris paribus, the level of fire protection in a community increases with level of fire and water expenditures and decreases as fire hazards and population increase (recall that the crowding variable is a decreasing measure of fire hazard). The magnitude of f, the estimate of elasticity of congestion, is especially striking. The estimated value of about -0.24 indicates as predicted that fire protection exhibits considerably less congestion than a private good. A 1 percent increase in community population causes approximately a a percent decrease in the level of fire protection, holding fire suppression capacity and the level of fire hazards constant. Although the estimate of the elasticity of congestion is negative, it is interesting to note that the simple correlation between population and the fire protection index is positive; large communities tend to have better fire insurance ratings than small ones.14 A "The sources for fire insurance ratings were IS0 of Illinois (1979 ), IS0 of Indiana (1977 ), IS0 of Michigan (1979 ), and IS0 of Wisconsin (1978 .
13See State Board of Insurance of Texas (1973) . Regressions using the insurance rating index compiled by the Texas state government yielded very poor results, with none of the independent variables exhibiting any explanatory power. "It is interesting to note that deletion of Chicago. whose population is nearly three times as large as the next largest city in the sample (Detroit). does not substantially change the regression results. While the fire insurance ratings of all but two communities in the sample are less than or equal to 6, with 4's and 5's being most common, one small community has a rating of 7 and another has a rating of 9, one point away from the worst possible rating. Deletion of the latter community changes some of the estimated coefficients, as the second row of table 1 shows. The estimated elasticity of congestion rises to about -0.11, but the parameter is still significantly different from zero. The most striking change is in the estimated water supply coefficient which, while negative, is no longer significantly different from zero. Although this change appears to contradict the model, an explanation is suggested by the fact that the deleted community's poor insurance rating was accompanied by extremely low water supply expenditures.
Deletion of the community eliminated the positive association in the data between E, and the fire protection measure, an outcome which makes sense under the supposition that the extra fire suppression capacity afforded by additional water supply capacity is zero in communities with reasonably good insurance ratings, such as those in the restricted sample. Inclusion in the sample of a community with a poor water supply system, however, causes the regression to pick up the positive effect of E, on the fire protection measure which is felt in such communities.
Further restriction of the sample to communities with populations exceeding 45,000 leads to qualitatively similar results, which are shown in the third row of table 1. The signs of significant coefficients remain the same, with the point estimate of the congestion elasticity falling to about -0.19, Confidence intervals for 7 in the two restricted samples are contained in the second and third rows of table 2, and their location toward the right end of the interval [-l,O] further supports the conclusion that the congestion properties of fire protection are much like those of a pure public good.
Since the marginal productivity of water supply capacity appears to be zero in the restricted samples, returns to scale in consumption is appropriately defined in terms of fire department capacity and population. The sum of LY and y thus gives the degree of returns to scale in consumption, with the estimates in the second and third rows of table 1 indicating increasing returns. Increasing fire department capacity and population by the same proportion leads to a higher level of protection. Or, holding per cupitu congestion properties of a local public good. It has been shown that fire protection exhibits substantial publicness, with 95 percent confidence intervals for the elasticity of congestion lying well to the right in the interval [ -l,O] . This result conforms well to intuition, which suggests that increasing a community's population should not greatly reduce the, level of fire protection, holding suppression capacity fixed.
It has also been shown that fire protection exhibits increasing returns to scale in consumption.
When attention is restricted to communities with relatively good fire insurance ratings, this means that the level of fire protection increases with the size of the community, holding per capita lire expenditures fixed. It follows that a given level of fire protection may be provided at a lower per capita cost in a larger community.
This result is obviously extremely useful for long-range government planning in a growing community.
Finally, the results in this paper bear on the issue of optimal city size. The congestion properties of local public goods must be considered in any theoretical model where city population is chosen to maximize the welfare of urban residents. If local public goods exhibit a high degree of publicness, optimal size cities will be relatively large [see Brueckner (1979a) ].
